Patchwork [v3,4/5] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices

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Submitter Thiebaud Weksteen via tpmdd-devel
Date Sept. 20, 2017, 8:13 a.m.
Message ID <20170920081340.7413-5-tweek@google.com>
Download mbox | patch
Permalink /patch/342475/
State New
Headers show

Comments

Thiebaud Weksteen via tpmdd-devel - Sept. 20, 2017, 8:13 a.m.
With TPM 2.0 specification, the event logs may only be accessible by
calling an EFI Boot Service. Modify the EFI stub to copy the log area to
a new Linux-specific EFI configuration table so it remains accessible
once booted.

When calling this service, it is possible to specify the expected format
of the logs: TPM 1.2 (SHA1) or TPM 2.0 ("Crypto Agile"). For now, only the
first format is retrieved.

Signed-off-by: Thiebaud Weksteen <tweek@google.com>
---
 arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c      |  1 +
 drivers/firmware/efi/Makefile         |  2 +-
 drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c            |  4 ++
 drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile |  3 +-
 drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/tpm.c    | 81 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 drivers/firmware/efi/tpm.c            | 40 +++++++++++++++++
 include/linux/efi.h                   | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++
 7 files changed, 174 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 drivers/firmware/efi/tpm.c
Jarkko Sakkinen - Sept. 26, 2017, 11:45 a.m.
On Wed, Sep 20, 2017 at 10:13:39AM +0200, Thiebaud Weksteen wrote:
> With TPM 2.0 specification, the event logs may only be accessible by
> calling an EFI Boot Service. Modify the EFI stub to copy the log area to
> a new Linux-specific EFI configuration table so it remains accessible
> once booted.
> 
> When calling this service, it is possible to specify the expected format
> of the logs: TPM 1.2 (SHA1) or TPM 2.0 ("Crypto Agile"). For now, only the
> first format is retrieved.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Thiebaud Weksteen <tweek@google.com>

Does not apply:

Applying: tpm: move tpm_eventlog.h outside of drivers folder
Applying: tpm: rename event log provider files
Applying: tpm: add event log format version
Applying: efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices
error: sha1 information is lacking or useless (drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c).
error: could not build fake ancestor
Patch failed at 0004 efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices
The copy of the patch that failed is found in: .git/rebase-apply/patch
When you have resolved this problem, run "git am --continue".
If you prefer to skip this patch, run "git am --skip" instead.
To restore the original branch and stop patching, run "git am --abort".

Just rebased my tree to the latest security-next.

/Jarkko

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Thiebaud Weksteen via tpmdd-devel - Sept. 26, 2017, 12:49 p.m.
On Tue, Sep 26, 2017 at 1:45 PM, Jarkko Sakkinen
<jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> wrote:
> On Wed, Sep 20, 2017 at 10:13:39AM +0200, Thiebaud Weksteen wrote:
>> With TPM 2.0 specification, the event logs may only be accessible by
>> calling an EFI Boot Service. Modify the EFI stub to copy the log area to
>> a new Linux-specific EFI configuration table so it remains accessible
>> once booted.
>>
>> When calling this service, it is possible to specify the expected format
>> of the logs: TPM 1.2 (SHA1) or TPM 2.0 ("Crypto Agile"). For now, only the
>> first format is retrieved.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Thiebaud Weksteen <tweek@google.com>
>
> Does not apply:
>
> Applying: tpm: move tpm_eventlog.h outside of drivers folder
> Applying: tpm: rename event log provider files
> Applying: tpm: add event log format version
> Applying: efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices
> error: sha1 information is lacking or useless (drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c).
> error: could not build fake ancestor
> Patch failed at 0004 efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices
> The copy of the patch that failed is found in: .git/rebase-apply/patch
> When you have resolved this problem, run "git am --continue".
> If you prefer to skip this patch, run "git am --skip" instead.
> To restore the original branch and stop patching, run "git am --abort".
>
> Just rebased my tree to the latest security-next.

It applies fine on security/next-general which is more up-to-date.
(security/next does not include
ccc829ba3624beb9a703fc995d016b836d9eead8 on which this patch set is
based)

>
> /Jarkko

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Jarkko Sakkinen - Sept. 29, 2017, 5:16 p.m.
On Tue, Sep 26, 2017 at 02:49:31PM +0200, Thiebaud Weksteen wrote:
> On Tue, Sep 26, 2017 at 1:45 PM, Jarkko Sakkinen
> <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> wrote:
> > On Wed, Sep 20, 2017 at 10:13:39AM +0200, Thiebaud Weksteen wrote:
> >> With TPM 2.0 specification, the event logs may only be accessible by
> >> calling an EFI Boot Service. Modify the EFI stub to copy the log area to
> >> a new Linux-specific EFI configuration table so it remains accessible
> >> once booted.
> >>
> >> When calling this service, it is possible to specify the expected format
> >> of the logs: TPM 1.2 (SHA1) or TPM 2.0 ("Crypto Agile"). For now, only the
> >> first format is retrieved.
> >>
> >> Signed-off-by: Thiebaud Weksteen <tweek@google.com>
> >
> > Does not apply:
> >
> > Applying: tpm: move tpm_eventlog.h outside of drivers folder
> > Applying: tpm: rename event log provider files
> > Applying: tpm: add event log format version
> > Applying: efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices
> > error: sha1 information is lacking or useless (drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c).
> > error: could not build fake ancestor
> > Patch failed at 0004 efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices
> > The copy of the patch that failed is found in: .git/rebase-apply/patch
> > When you have resolved this problem, run "git am --continue".
> > If you prefer to skip this patch, run "git am --skip" instead.
> > To restore the original branch and stop patching, run "git am --abort".
> >
> > Just rebased my tree to the latest security-next.
> 
> It applies fine on security/next-general which is more up-to-date.
> (security/next does not include
> ccc829ba3624beb9a703fc995d016b836d9eead8 on which this patch set is
> based)

Thanks, my bad, I though that I had it updated.

I'll update my tree and retry.

/Jarkko

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Jarkko Sakkinen - Oct. 4, 2017, 10:51 a.m.
On Fri, Sep 29, 2017 at 08:16:17PM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> On Tue, Sep 26, 2017 at 02:49:31PM +0200, Thiebaud Weksteen wrote:
> > On Tue, Sep 26, 2017 at 1:45 PM, Jarkko Sakkinen
> > <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> wrote:
> > > On Wed, Sep 20, 2017 at 10:13:39AM +0200, Thiebaud Weksteen wrote:
> > >> With TPM 2.0 specification, the event logs may only be accessible by
> > >> calling an EFI Boot Service. Modify the EFI stub to copy the log area to
> > >> a new Linux-specific EFI configuration table so it remains accessible
> > >> once booted.
> > >>
> > >> When calling this service, it is possible to specify the expected format
> > >> of the logs: TPM 1.2 (SHA1) or TPM 2.0 ("Crypto Agile"). For now, only the
> > >> first format is retrieved.
> > >>
> > >> Signed-off-by: Thiebaud Weksteen <tweek@google.com>
> > >
> > > Does not apply:
> > >
> > > Applying: tpm: move tpm_eventlog.h outside of drivers folder
> > > Applying: tpm: rename event log provider files
> > > Applying: tpm: add event log format version
> > > Applying: efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices
> > > error: sha1 information is lacking or useless (drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c).
> > > error: could not build fake ancestor
> > > Patch failed at 0004 efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices
> > > The copy of the patch that failed is found in: .git/rebase-apply/patch
> > > When you have resolved this problem, run "git am --continue".
> > > If you prefer to skip this patch, run "git am --skip" instead.
> > > To restore the original branch and stop patching, run "git am --abort".
> > >
> > > Just rebased my tree to the latest security-next.
> > 
> > It applies fine on security/next-general which is more up-to-date.
> > (security/next does not include
> > ccc829ba3624beb9a703fc995d016b836d9eead8 on which this patch set is
> > based)
> 
> Thanks, my bad, I though that I had it updated.
> 
> I'll update my tree and retry.
> 
> /Jarkko

My master is up to date with security/next.

Still get the same result:

$ git am -3 ~/Downloads/v3-4-5-efi-call-get_event_log-before-ExitBootServices.patch
Applying: efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices
error: sha1 information is lacking or useless (drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c).
error: could not build fake ancestor
Patch failed at 0001 efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices
The copy of the patch that failed is found in: .git/rebase-apply/patch
When you have resolved this problem, run "git am --continue".
If you prefer to skip this patch, run "git am --skip" instead.
To restore the original branch and stop patching, run "git am --abort".

Maybe you have some other trees fetched in your local GIT so that it
finds the ancestors? Anyway, cannot test this at this point.

/Jarkko

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Thiebaud Weksteen via tpmdd-devel - Oct. 4, 2017, 11:12 a.m.
On Wed, Oct 4, 2017 at 12:51 PM, Jarkko Sakkinen
<jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> wrote:
> On Fri, Sep 29, 2017 at 08:16:17PM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
>> On Tue, Sep 26, 2017 at 02:49:31PM +0200, Thiebaud Weksteen wrote:
>> > On Tue, Sep 26, 2017 at 1:45 PM, Jarkko Sakkinen
>> > <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> wrote:
>> > > On Wed, Sep 20, 2017 at 10:13:39AM +0200, Thiebaud Weksteen wrote:
>> > >> With TPM 2.0 specification, the event logs may only be accessible by
>> > >> calling an EFI Boot Service. Modify the EFI stub to copy the log area to
>> > >> a new Linux-specific EFI configuration table so it remains accessible
>> > >> once booted.
>> > >>
>> > >> When calling this service, it is possible to specify the expected format
>> > >> of the logs: TPM 1.2 (SHA1) or TPM 2.0 ("Crypto Agile"). For now, only the
>> > >> first format is retrieved.
>> > >>
>> > >> Signed-off-by: Thiebaud Weksteen <tweek@google.com>
>> > >
>> > > Does not apply:
>> > >
>> > > Applying: tpm: move tpm_eventlog.h outside of drivers folder
>> > > Applying: tpm: rename event log provider files
>> > > Applying: tpm: add event log format version
>> > > Applying: efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices
>> > > error: sha1 information is lacking or useless (drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c).
>> > > error: could not build fake ancestor
>> > > Patch failed at 0004 efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices
>> > > The copy of the patch that failed is found in: .git/rebase-apply/patch
>> > > When you have resolved this problem, run "git am --continue".
>> > > If you prefer to skip this patch, run "git am --skip" instead.
>> > > To restore the original branch and stop patching, run "git am --abort".
>> > >
>> > > Just rebased my tree to the latest security-next.
>> >
>> > It applies fine on security/next-general which is more up-to-date.
>> > (security/next does not include
>> > ccc829ba3624beb9a703fc995d016b836d9eead8 on which this patch set is
>> > based)
>>
>> Thanks, my bad, I though that I had it updated.
>>
>> I'll update my tree and retry.
>>
>> /Jarkko
>
> My master is up to date with security/next.
>
> Still get the same result:
>
> $ git am -3 ~/Downloads/v3-4-5-efi-call-get_event_log-before-ExitBootServices.patch
> Applying: efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices
> error: sha1 information is lacking or useless (drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c).
> error: could not build fake ancestor
> Patch failed at 0001 efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices
> The copy of the patch that failed is found in: .git/rebase-apply/patch
> When you have resolved this problem, run "git am --continue".
> If you prefer to skip this patch, run "git am --skip" instead.
> To restore the original branch and stop patching, run "git am --abort".
>
> Maybe you have some other trees fetched in your local GIT so that it
> finds the ancestors? Anyway, cannot test this at this point.
>
> /Jarkko

The security/next branch still does not contain the commit I mentioned
(ccc829ba3624beb9a703fc995d016b836d9eead8), which is already part of
torvalds/master now.

 $ git branch -a --contains ccc829ba3624beb9a703fc995d016b836d9eead8
  efi_tpm2_eventlog
  master
  remotes/linux-next/akpm
  remotes/linux-next/akpm-base
  remotes/linux-next/master
  remotes/linux-next/stable
  remotes/security/fixes-v4.14-rc3
  remotes/security/fixes-v4.14-rc4
  remotes/security/next-general
  remotes/security/next-testing
  remotes/torvalds/master

Is there any reason why you are trying to merge on that specific
branch and not next-general or next-testing? Would you know the
purpose of all these next-* branches?

Thanks,
Thiebaud

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Jarkko Sakkinen - Oct. 4, 2017, 11:20 a.m.
On Wed, Oct 04, 2017 at 01:51:13PM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> On Fri, Sep 29, 2017 at 08:16:17PM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > On Tue, Sep 26, 2017 at 02:49:31PM +0200, Thiebaud Weksteen wrote:
> > > On Tue, Sep 26, 2017 at 1:45 PM, Jarkko Sakkinen
> > > <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> wrote:
> > > > On Wed, Sep 20, 2017 at 10:13:39AM +0200, Thiebaud Weksteen wrote:
> > > >> With TPM 2.0 specification, the event logs may only be accessible by
> > > >> calling an EFI Boot Service. Modify the EFI stub to copy the log area to
> > > >> a new Linux-specific EFI configuration table so it remains accessible
> > > >> once booted.
> > > >>
> > > >> When calling this service, it is possible to specify the expected format
> > > >> of the logs: TPM 1.2 (SHA1) or TPM 2.0 ("Crypto Agile"). For now, only the
> > > >> first format is retrieved.
> > > >>
> > > >> Signed-off-by: Thiebaud Weksteen <tweek@google.com>
> > > >
> > > > Does not apply:
> > > >
> > > > Applying: tpm: move tpm_eventlog.h outside of drivers folder
> > > > Applying: tpm: rename event log provider files
> > > > Applying: tpm: add event log format version
> > > > Applying: efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices
> > > > error: sha1 information is lacking or useless (drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c).
> > > > error: could not build fake ancestor
> > > > Patch failed at 0004 efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices
> > > > The copy of the patch that failed is found in: .git/rebase-apply/patch
> > > > When you have resolved this problem, run "git am --continue".
> > > > If you prefer to skip this patch, run "git am --skip" instead.
> > > > To restore the original branch and stop patching, run "git am --abort".
> > > >
> > > > Just rebased my tree to the latest security-next.
> > > 
> > > It applies fine on security/next-general which is more up-to-date.
> > > (security/next does not include
> > > ccc829ba3624beb9a703fc995d016b836d9eead8 on which this patch set is
> > > based)
> > 
> > Thanks, my bad, I though that I had it updated.
> > 
> > I'll update my tree and retry.
> > 
> > /Jarkko
> 
> My master is up to date with security/next.
> 
> Still get the same result:
> 
> $ git am -3 ~/Downloads/v3-4-5-efi-call-get_event_log-before-ExitBootServices.patch
> Applying: efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices
> error: sha1 information is lacking or useless (drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c).
> error: could not build fake ancestor
> Patch failed at 0001 efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices
> The copy of the patch that failed is found in: .git/rebase-apply/patch
> When you have resolved this problem, run "git am --continue".
> If you prefer to skip this patch, run "git am --skip" instead.
> To restore the original branch and stop patching, run "git am --abort".
> 
> Maybe you have some other trees fetched in your local GIT so that it
> finds the ancestors? Anyway, cannot test this at this point.
> 
> /Jarkko

I pushed the first three patches to my master as they looked OK. You
should still consider them unreviewed.

/Jarkko

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Jarkko Sakkinen - Oct. 10, 2017, 2:14 p.m.
On Wed, Oct 04, 2017 at 01:12:27PM +0200, Thiebaud Weksteen wrote:
> On Wed, Oct 4, 2017 at 12:51 PM, Jarkko Sakkinen
> <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> wrote:
> > On Fri, Sep 29, 2017 at 08:16:17PM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> >> On Tue, Sep 26, 2017 at 02:49:31PM +0200, Thiebaud Weksteen wrote:
> >> > On Tue, Sep 26, 2017 at 1:45 PM, Jarkko Sakkinen
> >> > <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> wrote:
> >> > > On Wed, Sep 20, 2017 at 10:13:39AM +0200, Thiebaud Weksteen wrote:
> >> > >> With TPM 2.0 specification, the event logs may only be accessible by
> >> > >> calling an EFI Boot Service. Modify the EFI stub to copy the log area to
> >> > >> a new Linux-specific EFI configuration table so it remains accessible
> >> > >> once booted.
> >> > >>
> >> > >> When calling this service, it is possible to specify the expected format
> >> > >> of the logs: TPM 1.2 (SHA1) or TPM 2.0 ("Crypto Agile"). For now, only the
> >> > >> first format is retrieved.
> >> > >>
> >> > >> Signed-off-by: Thiebaud Weksteen <tweek@google.com>
> >> > >
> >> > > Does not apply:
> >> > >
> >> > > Applying: tpm: move tpm_eventlog.h outside of drivers folder
> >> > > Applying: tpm: rename event log provider files
> >> > > Applying: tpm: add event log format version
> >> > > Applying: efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices
> >> > > error: sha1 information is lacking or useless (drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c).
> >> > > error: could not build fake ancestor
> >> > > Patch failed at 0004 efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices
> >> > > The copy of the patch that failed is found in: .git/rebase-apply/patch
> >> > > When you have resolved this problem, run "git am --continue".
> >> > > If you prefer to skip this patch, run "git am --skip" instead.
> >> > > To restore the original branch and stop patching, run "git am --abort".
> >> > >
> >> > > Just rebased my tree to the latest security-next.
> >> >
> >> > It applies fine on security/next-general which is more up-to-date.
> >> > (security/next does not include
> >> > ccc829ba3624beb9a703fc995d016b836d9eead8 on which this patch set is
> >> > based)
> >>
> >> Thanks, my bad, I though that I had it updated.
> >>
> >> I'll update my tree and retry.
> >>
> >> /Jarkko
> >
> > My master is up to date with security/next.
> >
> > Still get the same result:
> >
> > $ git am -3 ~/Downloads/v3-4-5-efi-call-get_event_log-before-ExitBootServices.patch
> > Applying: efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices
> > error: sha1 information is lacking or useless (drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c).
> > error: could not build fake ancestor
> > Patch failed at 0001 efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices
> > The copy of the patch that failed is found in: .git/rebase-apply/patch
> > When you have resolved this problem, run "git am --continue".
> > If you prefer to skip this patch, run "git am --skip" instead.
> > To restore the original branch and stop patching, run "git am --abort".
> >
> > Maybe you have some other trees fetched in your local GIT so that it
> > finds the ancestors? Anyway, cannot test this at this point.
> >
> > /Jarkko
> 
> The security/next branch still does not contain the commit I mentioned
> (ccc829ba3624beb9a703fc995d016b836d9eead8), which is already part of
> torvalds/master now.
> 
>  $ git branch -a --contains ccc829ba3624beb9a703fc995d016b836d9eead8
>   efi_tpm2_eventlog
>   master
>   remotes/linux-next/akpm
>   remotes/linux-next/akpm-base
>   remotes/linux-next/master
>   remotes/linux-next/stable
>   remotes/security/fixes-v4.14-rc3
>   remotes/security/fixes-v4.14-rc4
>   remotes/security/next-general
>   remotes/security/next-testing
>   remotes/torvalds/master
> 
> Is there any reason why you are trying to merge on that specific
> branch and not next-general or next-testing? Would you know the
> purpose of all these next-* branches?
> 
> Thanks,
> Thiebaud

The way I've agreed with James Morris to have my tree is to be rooted to
security trees next branch.

James, what actions should we take?

/Jarkko

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James Morris - Oct. 11, 2017, 1:54 a.m.
On Tue, 10 Oct 2017, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:

> The way I've agreed with James Morris to have my tree is to be rooted to
> security trees next branch.
> 
> James, what actions should we take?

This process has changed recently -- I posted to lsm but forgot to post to 
linux-integrity.

http://kernsec.org/pipermail/linux-security-module-archive/2017-September/003356.html

Summary: please track the next-general branch in my tree for your 
development, it replaces 'next'.


- James
Jarkko Sakkinen - Oct. 11, 2017, 11:52 a.m.
On Wed, Oct 11, 2017 at 12:54:26PM +1100, James Morris wrote:
> On Tue, 10 Oct 2017, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> 
> > The way I've agreed with James Morris to have my tree is to be rooted to
> > security trees next branch.
> > 
> > James, what actions should we take?
> 
> This process has changed recently -- I posted to lsm but forgot to post to 
> linux-integrity.
> 
> http://kernsec.org/pipermail/linux-security-module-archive/2017-September/003356.html
> 
> Summary: please track the next-general branch in my tree for your 
> development, it replaces 'next'.
> 
> 
> - James
> -- 
> James Morris
> <jmorris@namei.org>

Ah I'm subscribed to that list but lately been busy getting a huge patch
set to platform-driver-x86 [1] for review, which has prioritized out
reading much else than linux-integrity.

Thank you. I'll retry the patches tomorrow.

/Jarkko

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Jarkko Sakkinen - Oct. 11, 2017, 11:53 a.m.
On Wed, Oct 11, 2017 at 02:52:54PM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> On Wed, Oct 11, 2017 at 12:54:26PM +1100, James Morris wrote:
> > On Tue, 10 Oct 2017, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > 
> > > The way I've agreed with James Morris to have my tree is to be rooted to
> > > security trees next branch.
> > > 
> > > James, what actions should we take?
> > 
> > This process has changed recently -- I posted to lsm but forgot to post to 
> > linux-integrity.
> > 
> > http://kernsec.org/pipermail/linux-security-module-archive/2017-September/003356.html
> > 
> > Summary: please track the next-general branch in my tree for your 
> > development, it replaces 'next'.
> > 
> > 
> > - James
> > -- 
> > James Morris
> > <jmorris@namei.org>
> 
> Ah I'm subscribed to that list but lately been busy getting a huge patch
> set to platform-driver-x86 [1] for review, which has prioritized out
> reading much else than linux-integrity.
> 
> Thank you. I'll retry the patches tomorrow.
> 
> /Jarkko

[1] http://www.spinics.net/lists/platform-driver-x86/msg13260.html

/Jarkko

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Jarkko Sakkinen - Oct. 12, 2017, 11:38 a.m.
On Wed, Oct 11, 2017 at 02:53:18PM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> On Wed, Oct 11, 2017 at 02:52:54PM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > On Wed, Oct 11, 2017 at 12:54:26PM +1100, James Morris wrote:
> > > On Tue, 10 Oct 2017, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > > 
> > > > The way I've agreed with James Morris to have my tree is to be rooted to
> > > > security trees next branch.
> > > > 
> > > > James, what actions should we take?
> > > 
> > > This process has changed recently -- I posted to lsm but forgot to post to 
> > > linux-integrity.
> > > 
> > > http://kernsec.org/pipermail/linux-security-module-archive/2017-September/003356.html
> > > 
> > > Summary: please track the next-general branch in my tree for your 
> > > development, it replaces 'next'.
> > > 
> > > 
> > > - James
> > > -- 
> > > James Morris
> > > <jmorris@namei.org>
> > 
> > Ah I'm subscribed to that list but lately been busy getting a huge patch
> > set to platform-driver-x86 [1] for review, which has prioritized out
> > reading much else than linux-integrity.
> > 
> > Thank you. I'll retry the patches tomorrow.
> > 
> > /Jarkko
> 
> [1] http://www.spinics.net/lists/platform-driver-x86/msg13260.html
> 
> /Jarkko

Now all Thiebaud's patches have been applied to the master of

  git://git.infradead.org/users/jjs/linux-tpmdd.git

Testing is still pending.

/Jarkko

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Jarkko Sakkinen - Oct. 13, 2017, 7:47 p.m.
On Thu, Oct 12, 2017 at 05:03:38PM +0200, Javier Martinez Canillas wrote:
> On Thu, Oct 12, 2017 at 1:38 PM, Jarkko Sakkinen
> <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> wrote:
> 
> [snip]
> 
> >
> > Now all Thiebaud's patches have been applied to the master of
> >
> >   git://git.infradead.org/users/jjs/linux-tpmdd.git
> >
> > Testing is still pending.
> >
> 
> I provided my reviewed and tested by tags for the patches but I
> noticed that weren't picked. Probably my fault though since I answered
> to the cover letter instead of the individual patches.
> 
> > /Jarkko
> 
> Best regards,
> Javier

I will add it. The master branch is bleeding edge where tags might be
sometimes (*not* usually) missing. The next branch is the one that goes
to linux-next.

I'll check all tags from patchwork before moving any of these to next.

/Jarkko

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Jarkko Sakkinen - Oct. 16, 2017, 11:28 a.m.
On Wed, Oct 11, 2017 at 02:52:54PM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> On Wed, Oct 11, 2017 at 12:54:26PM +1100, James Morris wrote:
> > On Tue, 10 Oct 2017, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > 
> > > The way I've agreed with James Morris to have my tree is to be rooted to
> > > security trees next branch.
> > > 
> > > James, what actions should we take?
> > 
> > This process has changed recently -- I posted to lsm but forgot to post to 
> > linux-integrity.
> > 
> > http://kernsec.org/pipermail/linux-security-module-archive/2017-September/003356.html
> > 
> > Summary: please track the next-general branch in my tree for your 
> > development, it replaces 'next'.
> > 
> > 
> > - James
> > -- 
> > James Morris
> > <jmorris@namei.org>
> 
> Ah I'm subscribed to that list but lately been busy getting a huge patch
> set to platform-driver-x86 [1] for review, which has prioritized out
> reading much else than linux-integrity.
> 
> Thank you. I'll retry the patches tomorrow.
> 
> /Jarkko

Cannot observer binary_bios_measuremens file.

What kind of hardware was used to develop/test this?

I tried it with Kabylake and PTT (firmware TPM).

/Jarkko

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Jarkko Sakkinen - Oct. 16, 2017, 11:34 a.m.
On Fri, Oct 13, 2017 at 10:47:46PM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> On Thu, Oct 12, 2017 at 05:03:38PM +0200, Javier Martinez Canillas wrote:
> > On Thu, Oct 12, 2017 at 1:38 PM, Jarkko Sakkinen
> > <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> wrote:
> > 
> > [snip]
> > 
> > >
> > > Now all Thiebaud's patches have been applied to the master of
> > >
> > >   git://git.infradead.org/users/jjs/linux-tpmdd.git
> > >
> > > Testing is still pending.
> > >
> > 
> > I provided my reviewed and tested by tags for the patches but I
> > noticed that weren't picked. Probably my fault though since I answered
> > to the cover letter instead of the individual patches.
> > 
> > > /Jarkko
> > 
> > Best regards,
> > Javier
> 
> I will add it. The master branch is bleeding edge where tags might be
> sometimes (*not* usually) missing. The next branch is the one that goes
> to linux-next.
> 
> I'll check all tags from patchwork before moving any of these to next.
> 
> /Jarkko

Updated.

/Jarkko

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Jarkko Sakkinen - Oct. 16, 2017, 11:49 a.m.
On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 02:28:33PM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> On Wed, Oct 11, 2017 at 02:52:54PM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > On Wed, Oct 11, 2017 at 12:54:26PM +1100, James Morris wrote:
> > > On Tue, 10 Oct 2017, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > > 
> > > > The way I've agreed with James Morris to have my tree is to be rooted to
> > > > security trees next branch.
> > > > 
> > > > James, what actions should we take?
> > > 
> > > This process has changed recently -- I posted to lsm but forgot to post to 
> > > linux-integrity.
> > > 
> > > http://kernsec.org/pipermail/linux-security-module-archive/2017-September/003356.html
> > > 
> > > Summary: please track the next-general branch in my tree for your 
> > > development, it replaces 'next'.
> > > 
> > > 
> > > - James
> > > -- 
> > > James Morris
> > > <jmorris@namei.org>
> > 
> > Ah I'm subscribed to that list but lately been busy getting a huge patch
> > set to platform-driver-x86 [1] for review, which has prioritized out
> > reading much else than linux-integrity.
> > 
> > Thank you. I'll retry the patches tomorrow.
> > 
> > /Jarkko
> 
> Cannot observer binary_bios_measuremens file.
> 
> What kind of hardware was used to develop/test this?
> 
> I tried it with Kabylake and PTT (firmware TPM).
> 
> /Jarkko

My guess would be wrong event log format.

At minimum this patch set should add a klog (info level) message to tell
that unsupported event log format is being used.

/Jarkko

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Thiebaud Weksteen via tpmdd-devel - Oct. 17, 2017, 8 a.m.
On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 1:49 PM, Jarkko Sakkinen
<jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> wrote:
> On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 02:28:33PM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
>> On Wed, Oct 11, 2017 at 02:52:54PM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
>> > On Wed, Oct 11, 2017 at 12:54:26PM +1100, James Morris wrote:
>> > > On Tue, 10 Oct 2017, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
>> > >
>> > > > The way I've agreed with James Morris to have my tree is to be rooted to
>> > > > security trees next branch.
>> > > >
>> > > > James, what actions should we take?
>> > >
>> > > This process has changed recently -- I posted to lsm but forgot to post to
>> > > linux-integrity.
>> > >
>> > > http://kernsec.org/pipermail/linux-security-module-archive/2017-September/003356.html
>> > >
>> > > Summary: please track the next-general branch in my tree for your
>> > > development, it replaces 'next'.
>> > >
>> > >
>> > > - James
>> > > --
>> > > James Morris
>> > > <jmorris@namei.org>
>> >
>> > Ah I'm subscribed to that list but lately been busy getting a huge patch
>> > set to platform-driver-x86 [1] for review, which has prioritized out
>> > reading much else than linux-integrity.
>> >
>> > Thank you. I'll retry the patches tomorrow.
>> >
>> > /Jarkko
>>
>> Cannot observer binary_bios_measuremens file.
>>
>> What kind of hardware was used to develop/test this?
>>
>> I tried it with Kabylake and PTT (firmware TPM).
>>
>> /Jarkko
>
> My guess would be wrong event log format.
>
> At minimum this patch set should add a klog (info level) message to tell
> that unsupported event log format is being used.
>
> /Jarkko

This patch was mainly developed and tested on Kabylake with PTT as well.

It could be a few things. Are you booting with the EFI stub? Is the
TPM enabled within the BIOS? Does tpm_tis get loaded? Does it produce
any log?
If the logs are recovered (but not parsed), you should already see an
entry in the logs like:

efi:  SMBIOS=0x7fed6000  ACPI=0x7ff00000  TPMEventLog=0x.....

Can you see the TPMEventLog part?

The issue with extra logging is that the log recovery happens within
the EFI stub phase where limited logging is available (which I think
has been limited to error and fatal message only).
For now, it cannot be a version mismatch as the stub will only request
the version 1.2 format.

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Jarkko Sakkinen - Oct. 18, 2017, 3:11 p.m.
On Tue, Oct 17, 2017 at 10:00:15AM +0200, Thiebaud Weksteen wrote:
> On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 1:49 PM, Jarkko Sakkinen
> <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> wrote:
> > On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 02:28:33PM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> >> On Wed, Oct 11, 2017 at 02:52:54PM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> >> > On Wed, Oct 11, 2017 at 12:54:26PM +1100, James Morris wrote:
> >> > > On Tue, 10 Oct 2017, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> >> > >
> >> > > > The way I've agreed with James Morris to have my tree is to be rooted to
> >> > > > security trees next branch.
> >> > > >
> >> > > > James, what actions should we take?
> >> > >
> >> > > This process has changed recently -- I posted to lsm but forgot to post to
> >> > > linux-integrity.
> >> > >
> >> > > http://kernsec.org/pipermail/linux-security-module-archive/2017-September/003356.html
> >> > >
> >> > > Summary: please track the next-general branch in my tree for your
> >> > > development, it replaces 'next'.
> >> > >
> >> > >
> >> > > - James
> >> > > --
> >> > > James Morris
> >> > > <jmorris@namei.org>
> >> >
> >> > Ah I'm subscribed to that list but lately been busy getting a huge patch
> >> > set to platform-driver-x86 [1] for review, which has prioritized out
> >> > reading much else than linux-integrity.
> >> >
> >> > Thank you. I'll retry the patches tomorrow.
> >> >
> >> > /Jarkko
> >>
> >> Cannot observer binary_bios_measuremens file.
> >>
> >> What kind of hardware was used to develop/test this?
> >>
> >> I tried it with Kabylake and PTT (firmware TPM).
> >>
> >> /Jarkko
> >
> > My guess would be wrong event log format.
> >
> > At minimum this patch set should add a klog (info level) message to tell
> > that unsupported event log format is being used.
> >
> > /Jarkko
> 
> This patch was mainly developed and tested on Kabylake with PTT as well.
> 
> It could be a few things. Are you booting with the EFI stub? Is the
> TPM enabled within the BIOS? Does tpm_tis get loaded? Does it produce
> any log?
> If the logs are recovered (but not parsed), you should already see an
> entry in the logs like:
> 
> efi:  SMBIOS=0x7fed6000  ACPI=0x7ff00000  TPMEventLog=0x.....
> 
> Can you see the TPMEventLog part?
> 
> The issue with extra logging is that the log recovery happens within
> the EFI stub phase where limited logging is available (which I think
> has been limited to error and fatal message only).
> For now, it cannot be a version mismatch as the stub will only request
> the version 1.2 format.

Thank you for the great tips. I'll retry tomorrow.

/Jarkko

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Jarkko Sakkinen - Oct. 26, 2017, 6:58 p.m.
On Tue, Oct 17, 2017 at 10:00:15AM +0200, Thiebaud Weksteen wrote:
> This patch was mainly developed and tested on Kabylake with PTT as well.
> 
> It could be a few things. Are you booting with the EFI stub? Is the
> TPM enabled within the BIOS? Does tpm_tis get loaded? Does it produce
> any log?

Nope, and it should not get loaded anyway as I'm using PTT. With PTT you
use tpm_crb. TPM is working just fine.

> If the logs are recovered (but not parsed), you should already see an
> entry in the logs like:
> 
> efi:  SMBIOS=0x7fed6000  ACPI=0x7ff00000  TPMEventLog=0x.....
> 
> Can you see the TPMEventLog part?

I can check this when I'm back in Finland. Still in Prague. Tried to
test this with my work laptop (XPS13 with dTPM) now but the USB stick I
have with seems to be broken :-(

This is anyway almost guaranteed to go to 4.16  and I don't want to push
this to 4.15 so there is no rush right now (already sent my PR).

> The issue with extra logging is that the log recovery happens within
> the EFI stub phase where limited logging is available (which I think
> has been limited to error and fatal message only).
> For now, it cannot be a version mismatch as the stub will only request
> the version 1.2 format.

Right, I see.

/Jarkko

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Thiebaud Weksteen via tpmdd-devel - March 6, 2018, 10:15 a.m.
On Mon, Mar 5, 2018 at 4:40 PM Marc-André Lureau
<marcandre.lureau@gmail.com>
wrote:

> Hi Thiebaud

> On Wed, Sep 20, 2017 at 10:13 AM, Thiebaud Weksteen <tweek@google.com>
wrote:
> > With TPM 2.0 specification, the event logs may only be accessible by
> > calling an EFI Boot Service. Modify the EFI stub to copy the log area to
> > a new Linux-specific EFI configuration table so it remains accessible
> > once booted.
> >
> > When calling this service, it is possible to specify the expected format
> > of the logs: TPM 1.2 (SHA1) or TPM 2.0 ("Crypto Agile"). For now, only
the
> > first format is retrieved.
> >

> Do you have plans to add support for the crypto-agile format? I am
> working on uefi/ovmf support, and I am wondering if it is at all
> necessary to add support for the 1.2 format. What do you think? I can
> eventually try to work on 2.0 format support.

Yes, this is definitely my intent. I am running low on free time for this
piece of work to happen just now though.

Thanks


> Thanks

> > Signed-off-by: Thiebaud Weksteen <tweek@google.com>
> > ---
> >  arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c      |  1 +
> >  drivers/firmware/efi/Makefile         |  2 +-
> >  drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c            |  4 ++
> >  drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile |  3 +-
> >  drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/tpm.c    | 81
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> >  drivers/firmware/efi/tpm.c            | 40 +++++++++++++++++
> >  include/linux/efi.h                   | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++
> >  7 files changed, 174 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
> >  create mode 100644 drivers/firmware/efi/tpm.c
> >
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
> > index a1686f3dc295..ef6abe8b3788 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
> > +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
> > @@ -999,6 +999,7 @@ struct boot_params *efi_main(struct efi_config *c,
> >
> >         /* Ask the firmware to clear memory on unclean shutdown */
> >         efi_enable_reset_attack_mitigation(sys_table);
> > +       efi_retrieve_tpm2_eventlog(sys_table);
> >
> >         setup_graphics(boot_params);
> >
> > diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/Makefile
b/drivers/firmware/efi/Makefile
> > index 0329d319d89a..2f074b5cde87 100644
> > --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/Makefile
> > +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/Makefile
> > @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
> >  KASAN_SANITIZE_runtime-wrappers.o      := n
> >
> >  obj-$(CONFIG_ACPI_BGRT)                += efi-bgrt.o
> > -obj-$(CONFIG_EFI)                      += efi.o vars.o reboot.o
memattr.o
> > +obj-$(CONFIG_EFI)                      += efi.o vars.o reboot.o
memattr.o tpm.o
> >  obj-$(CONFIG_EFI)                      += capsule.o memmap.o
> >  obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_VARS)                 += efivars.o
> >  obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_ESRT)                 += esrt.o
> > diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c
> > index f97f272e16ee..0308acfaaf76 100644
> > --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c
> > +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c
> > @@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ struct efi __read_mostly efi = {
> >         .properties_table       = EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR,
> >         .mem_attr_table         = EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR,
> >         .rng_seed               = EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR,
> > +       .tpm_log                = EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR
> >  };
> >  EXPORT_SYMBOL(efi);
> >
> > @@ -444,6 +445,7 @@ static __initdata efi_config_table_type_t
common_tables[] = {
> >         {EFI_PROPERTIES_TABLE_GUID, "PROP", &efi.properties_table},
> >         {EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE_GUID, "MEMATTR",
&efi.mem_attr_table},
> >         {LINUX_EFI_RANDOM_SEED_TABLE_GUID, "RNG", &efi.rng_seed},
> > +       {LINUX_EFI_TPM_EVENT_LOG_GUID, "TPMEventLog", &efi.tpm_log},
> >         {NULL_GUID, NULL, NULL},
> >  };
> >
> > @@ -532,6 +534,8 @@ int __init efi_config_parse_tables(void
*config_tables, int count, int sz,
> >         if (efi_enabled(EFI_MEMMAP))
> >                 efi_memattr_init();
> >
> > +       efi_tpm_eventlog_init();
> > +
> >         /* Parse the EFI Properties table if it exists */
> >         if (efi.properties_table != EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR) {
> >                 efi_properties_table_t *tbl;
> > diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile
b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile
> > index dedf9bde44db..2abe6d22dc5f 100644
> > --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile
> > +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile
> > @@ -29,8 +29,7 @@ OBJECT_FILES_NON_STANDARD     := y
> >  # Prevents link failures: __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc() is not linked in.
> >  KCOV_INSTRUMENT                        := n
> >
> > -lib-y                          := efi-stub-helper.o gop.o secureboot.o
> > -lib-$(CONFIG_RESET_ATTACK_MITIGATION) += tpm.o
> > +lib-y                          := efi-stub-helper.o gop.o secureboot.o
tpm.o
> >
> >  # include the stub's generic dependencies from lib/ when building for
ARM/arm64
> >  arm-deps := fdt_rw.c fdt_ro.c fdt_wip.c fdt.c fdt_empty_tree.c
fdt_sw.c sort.c
> > diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/tpm.c
b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/tpm.c
> > index 6224cdbc9669..da661bf8cb96 100644
> > --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/tpm.c
> > +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/tpm.c
> > @@ -4,15 +4,18 @@
> >   * Copyright (C) 2016 CoreOS, Inc
> >   * Copyright (C) 2017 Google, Inc.
> >   *     Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
> > + *     Thiebaud Weksteen <tweek@google.com>
> >   *
> >   * This file is part of the Linux kernel, and is made available under
the
> >   * terms of the GNU General Public License version 2.
> >   */
> >  #include <linux/efi.h>
> > +#include <linux/tpm_eventlog.h>
> >  #include <asm/efi.h>
> >
> >  #include "efistub.h"
> >
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_RESET_ATTACK_MITIGATION
> >  static const efi_char16_t efi_MemoryOverWriteRequest_name[] = {
> >         'M', 'e', 'm', 'o', 'r', 'y', 'O', 'v', 'e', 'r', 'w', 'r',
'i', 't',
> >         'e', 'R', 'e', 'q', 'u', 'e', 's', 't', 'C', 'o', 'n', 't',
'r', 'o',
> > @@ -56,3 +59,81 @@ void
efi_enable_reset_attack_mitigation(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg)
> >                     EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS |
> >                     EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS, sizeof(val), &val);
> >  }
> > +
> > +#endif
> > +
> > +void efi_retrieve_tpm2_eventlog_1_2(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg)
> > +{
> > +       efi_guid_t tcg2_guid = EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL_GUID;
> > +       efi_guid_t linux_eventlog_guid = LINUX_EFI_TPM_EVENT_LOG_GUID;
> > +       efi_status_t status;
> > +       efi_physical_addr_t log_location, log_last_entry;
> > +       struct linux_efi_tpm_eventlog *log_tbl;
> > +       unsigned long first_entry_addr, last_entry_addr;
> > +       size_t log_size, last_entry_size;
> > +       efi_bool_t truncated;
> > +       void *tcg2_protocol;
> > +
> > +       status = efi_call_early(locate_protocol, &tcg2_guid, NULL,
> > +                               &tcg2_protocol);
> > +       if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
> > +               return;
> > +
> > +       status = efi_call_proto(efi_tcg2_protocol, get_event_log,
tcg2_protocol,
> > +                               EFI_TCG2_EVENT_LOG_FORMAT_TCG_1_2,
> > +                               &log_location, &log_last_entry,
&truncated);
> > +       if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
> > +               return;
> > +
> > +       if (!log_location)
> > +               return;
> > +       first_entry_addr = (unsigned long) log_location;
> > +
> > +       /*
> > +        * We populate the EFI table even if the logs are empty.
> > +        */
> > +       if (!log_last_entry) {
> > +               log_size = 0;
> > +       } else {
> > +               last_entry_addr = (unsigned long) log_last_entry;
> > +               /*
> > +                * get_event_log only returns the address of the last
entry.
> > +                * We need to calculate its size to deduce the full
size of
> > +                * the logs.
> > +                */
> > +               last_entry_size = sizeof(struct tcpa_event) +
> > +                       ((struct tcpa_event *)
last_entry_addr)->event_size;
> > +               log_size = log_last_entry - log_location +
last_entry_size;
> > +       }
> > +
> > +       /* Allocate space for the logs and copy them. */
> > +       status = efi_call_early(allocate_pool, EFI_LOADER_DATA,
> > +                               sizeof(*log_tbl) + log_size,
> > +                               (void **) &log_tbl);
> > +
> > +       if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) {
> > +               efi_printk(sys_table_arg,
> > +                          "Unable to allocate memory for event log\n");
> > +               return;
> > +       }
> > +
> > +       memset(log_tbl, 0, sizeof(*log_tbl) + log_size);
> > +       log_tbl->size = log_size;
> > +       log_tbl->version = EFI_TCG2_EVENT_LOG_FORMAT_TCG_1_2;
> > +       memcpy(log_tbl->log, (void *) first_entry_addr, log_size);
> > +
> > +       status = efi_call_early(install_configuration_table,
> > +                               &linux_eventlog_guid, log_tbl);
> > +       if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
> > +               goto err_free;
> > +       return;
> > +
> > +err_free:
> > +       efi_call_early(free_pool, log_tbl);
> > +}
> > +
> > +void efi_retrieve_tpm2_eventlog(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg)
> > +{
> > +       /* Only try to retrieve the logs in 1.2 format. */
> > +       efi_retrieve_tpm2_eventlog_1_2(sys_table_arg);
> > +}
> > diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/tpm.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/tpm.c
> > new file mode 100644
> > index 000000000000..0cbeb3d46b18
> > --- /dev/null
> > +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/tpm.c
> > @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
> > +/*
> > + * Copyright (C) 2017 Google, Inc.
> > + *     Thiebaud Weksteen <tweek@google.com>
> > + *
> > + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
> > + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
> > + * published by the Free Software Foundation.
> > + */
> > +
> > +#include <linux/efi.h>
> > +#include <linux/init.h>
> > +#include <linux/memblock.h>
> > +
> > +#include <asm/early_ioremap.h>
> > +
> > +/*
> > + * Reserve the memory associated with the TPM Event Log configuration
table.
> > + */
> > +int __init efi_tpm_eventlog_init(void)
> > +{
> > +       struct linux_efi_tpm_eventlog *log_tbl;
> > +       unsigned int tbl_size;
> > +
> > +       if (efi.tpm_log == EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR)
> > +               return 0;
> > +
> > +       log_tbl = early_memremap(efi.tpm_log, sizeof(*log_tbl));
> > +       if (!log_tbl) {
> > +               pr_err("Failed to map TPM Event Log table @ 0x%lx\n",
> > +                       efi.tpm_log);
> > +               efi.tpm_log = EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR;
> > +               return -ENOMEM;
> > +       }
> > +
> > +       tbl_size = sizeof(*log_tbl) + log_tbl->size;
> > +       memblock_reserve(efi.tpm_log, tbl_size);
> > +       early_memunmap(log_tbl, sizeof(*log_tbl));
> > +       return 0;
> > +}
> > +
> > diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h
> > index 8dc3d94a3e3c..c5805eb601b1 100644
> > --- a/include/linux/efi.h
> > +++ b/include/linux/efi.h
> > @@ -472,6 +472,39 @@ typedef struct {
> >         u64 get_all;
> >  } apple_properties_protocol_64_t;
> >
> > +typedef struct {
> > +       u32 get_capability;
> > +       u32 get_event_log;
> > +       u32 hash_log_extend_event;
> > +       u32 submit_command;
> > +       u32 get_active_pcr_banks;
> > +       u32 set_active_pcr_banks;
> > +       u32 get_result_of_set_active_pcr_banks;
> > +} efi_tcg2_protocol_32_t;
> > +
> > +typedef struct {
> > +       u64 get_capability;
> > +       u64 get_event_log;
> > +       u64 hash_log_extend_event;
> > +       u64 submit_command;
> > +       u64 get_active_pcr_banks;
> > +       u64 set_active_pcr_banks;
> > +       u64 get_result_of_set_active_pcr_banks;
> > +} efi_tcg2_protocol_64_t;
> > +
> > +typedef u32 efi_tcg2_event_log_format;
> > +
> > +typedef struct {
> > +       void *get_capability;
> > +       efi_status_t (*get_event_log)(efi_handle_t,
efi_tcg2_event_log_format,
> > +               efi_physical_addr_t *, efi_physical_addr_t *,
efi_bool_t *);
> > +       void *hash_log_extend_event;
> > +       void *submit_command;
> > +       void *get_active_pcr_banks;
> > +       void *set_active_pcr_banks;
> > +       void *get_result_of_set_active_pcr_banks;
> > +} efi_tcg2_protocol_t;
> > +
> >  /*
> >   * Types and defines for EFI ResetSystem
> >   */
> > @@ -622,6 +655,7 @@ void efi_native_runtime_setup(void);
> >  #define EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE_GUID       EFI_GUID(0xdcfa911d,
0x26eb, 0x469f,  0xa2, 0x20, 0x38, 0xb7, 0xdc, 0x46, 0x12, 0x20)
> >  #define EFI_CONSOLE_OUT_DEVICE_GUID            EFI_GUID(0xd3b36f2c,
0xd551, 0x11d4,  0x9a, 0x46, 0x00, 0x90, 0x27, 0x3f, 0xc1, 0x4d)
> >  #define APPLE_PROPERTIES_PROTOCOL_GUID         EFI_GUID(0x91bd12fe,
0xf6c3, 0x44fb,  0xa5, 0xb7, 0x51, 0x22, 0xab, 0x30, 0x3a, 0xe0)
> > +#define EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL_GUID                 EFI_GUID(0x607f766c,
0x7455, 0x42be,  0x93, 0x0b, 0xe4, 0xd7, 0x6d, 0xb2, 0x72, 0x0f)
> >
> >  #define EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE_GUID       EFI_GUID(0xd719b2cb,
0x3d3a, 0x4596,  0xa3, 0xbc, 0xda, 0xd0, 0x0e, 0x67, 0x65, 0x6f)
> >  #define EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID                     EFI_GUID(0x605dab50,
0xe046, 0x4300,  0xab, 0xb6, 0x3d, 0xd8, 0x10, 0xdd, 0x8b, 0x23)
> > @@ -634,6 +668,7 @@ void efi_native_runtime_setup(void);
> >  #define LINUX_EFI_ARM_SCREEN_INFO_TABLE_GUID   EFI_GUID(0xe03fc20a,
0x85dc, 0x406e,  0xb9, 0x0e, 0x4a, 0xb5, 0x02, 0x37, 0x1d, 0x95)
> >  #define LINUX_EFI_LOADER_ENTRY_GUID            EFI_GUID(0x4a67b082,
0x0a4c, 0x41cf,  0xb6, 0xc7, 0x44, 0x0b, 0x29, 0xbb, 0x8c, 0x4f)
> >  #define LINUX_EFI_RANDOM_SEED_TABLE_GUID       EFI_GUID(0x1ce1e5bc,
0x7ceb, 0x42f2,  0x81, 0xe5, 0x8a, 0xad, 0xf1, 0x80, 0xf5, 0x7b)
> > +#define LINUX_EFI_TPM_EVENT_LOG_GUID           EFI_GUID(0xb7799cb0,
0xeca2, 0x4943,  0x96, 0x67, 0x1f, 0xae, 0x07, 0xb7, 0x47, 0xfa)
> >
> >  typedef struct {
> >         efi_guid_t guid;
> > @@ -908,6 +943,7 @@ extern struct efi {
> >         unsigned long properties_table; /* properties table */
> >         unsigned long mem_attr_table;   /* memory attributes table */
> >         unsigned long rng_seed;         /* UEFI firmware random seed */
> > +       unsigned long tpm_log;          /* TPM2 Event Log table */
> >         efi_get_time_t *get_time;
> >         efi_set_time_t *set_time;
> >         efi_get_wakeup_time_t *get_wakeup_time;
> > @@ -1504,6 +1540,8 @@ static inline void
> >  efi_enable_reset_attack_mitigation(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg)
{ }
> >  #endif
> >
> > +void efi_retrieve_tpm2_eventlog(efi_system_table_t *sys_table);
> > +
> >  /*
> >   * Arch code can implement the following three template macros,
avoiding
> >   * reptition for the void/non-void return cases of
{__,}efi_call_virt():
> > @@ -1571,4 +1609,12 @@ struct linux_efi_random_seed {
> >         u8      bits[];
> >  };
> >
> > +struct linux_efi_tpm_eventlog {
> > +       u32     size;
> > +       u8      version;
> > +       u8      log[];
> > +};
> > +
> > +extern int efi_tpm_eventlog_init(void);
> > +
> >  #endif /* _LINUX_EFI_H */
> > --
> > 2.14.1.821.g8fa685d3b7-goog
> >



> --
> Marc-André Lureau

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Check out the vibrant tech community on one of the world's most
engaging tech sites, Slashdot.org! http://sdm.link/slashdot

Patch

diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
index a1686f3dc295..ef6abe8b3788 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
@@ -999,6 +999,7 @@  struct boot_params *efi_main(struct efi_config *c,
 
 	/* Ask the firmware to clear memory on unclean shutdown */
 	efi_enable_reset_attack_mitigation(sys_table);
+	efi_retrieve_tpm2_eventlog(sys_table);
 
 	setup_graphics(boot_params);
 
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/Makefile b/drivers/firmware/efi/Makefile
index 0329d319d89a..2f074b5cde87 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/Makefile
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/Makefile
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ 
 KASAN_SANITIZE_runtime-wrappers.o	:= n
 
 obj-$(CONFIG_ACPI_BGRT) 		+= efi-bgrt.o
-obj-$(CONFIG_EFI)			+= efi.o vars.o reboot.o memattr.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_EFI)			+= efi.o vars.o reboot.o memattr.o tpm.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_EFI)			+= capsule.o memmap.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_VARS)			+= efivars.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_ESRT)			+= esrt.o
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c
index f97f272e16ee..0308acfaaf76 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c
@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@  struct efi __read_mostly efi = {
 	.properties_table	= EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR,
 	.mem_attr_table		= EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR,
 	.rng_seed		= EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR,
+	.tpm_log		= EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR
 };
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(efi);
 
@@ -444,6 +445,7 @@  static __initdata efi_config_table_type_t common_tables[] = {
 	{EFI_PROPERTIES_TABLE_GUID, "PROP", &efi.properties_table},
 	{EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE_GUID, "MEMATTR", &efi.mem_attr_table},
 	{LINUX_EFI_RANDOM_SEED_TABLE_GUID, "RNG", &efi.rng_seed},
+	{LINUX_EFI_TPM_EVENT_LOG_GUID, "TPMEventLog", &efi.tpm_log},
 	{NULL_GUID, NULL, NULL},
 };
 
@@ -532,6 +534,8 @@  int __init efi_config_parse_tables(void *config_tables, int count, int sz,
 	if (efi_enabled(EFI_MEMMAP))
 		efi_memattr_init();
 
+	efi_tpm_eventlog_init();
+
 	/* Parse the EFI Properties table if it exists */
 	if (efi.properties_table != EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR) {
 		efi_properties_table_t *tbl;
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile
index dedf9bde44db..2abe6d22dc5f 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile
@@ -29,8 +29,7 @@  OBJECT_FILES_NON_STANDARD	:= y
 # Prevents link failures: __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc() is not linked in.
 KCOV_INSTRUMENT			:= n
 
-lib-y				:= efi-stub-helper.o gop.o secureboot.o
-lib-$(CONFIG_RESET_ATTACK_MITIGATION) += tpm.o
+lib-y				:= efi-stub-helper.o gop.o secureboot.o tpm.o
 
 # include the stub's generic dependencies from lib/ when building for ARM/arm64
 arm-deps := fdt_rw.c fdt_ro.c fdt_wip.c fdt.c fdt_empty_tree.c fdt_sw.c sort.c
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/tpm.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/tpm.c
index 6224cdbc9669..da661bf8cb96 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/tpm.c
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/tpm.c
@@ -4,15 +4,18 @@ 
  * Copyright (C) 2016 CoreOS, Inc
  * Copyright (C) 2017 Google, Inc.
  *     Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
+ *     Thiebaud Weksteen <tweek@google.com>
  *
  * This file is part of the Linux kernel, and is made available under the
  * terms of the GNU General Public License version 2.
  */
 #include <linux/efi.h>
+#include <linux/tpm_eventlog.h>
 #include <asm/efi.h>
 
 #include "efistub.h"
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_RESET_ATTACK_MITIGATION
 static const efi_char16_t efi_MemoryOverWriteRequest_name[] = {
 	'M', 'e', 'm', 'o', 'r', 'y', 'O', 'v', 'e', 'r', 'w', 'r', 'i', 't',
 	'e', 'R', 'e', 'q', 'u', 'e', 's', 't', 'C', 'o', 'n', 't', 'r', 'o',
@@ -56,3 +59,81 @@  void efi_enable_reset_attack_mitigation(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg)
 		    EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS |
 		    EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS, sizeof(val), &val);
 }
+
+#endif
+
+void efi_retrieve_tpm2_eventlog_1_2(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg)
+{
+	efi_guid_t tcg2_guid = EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL_GUID;
+	efi_guid_t linux_eventlog_guid = LINUX_EFI_TPM_EVENT_LOG_GUID;
+	efi_status_t status;
+	efi_physical_addr_t log_location, log_last_entry;
+	struct linux_efi_tpm_eventlog *log_tbl;
+	unsigned long first_entry_addr, last_entry_addr;
+	size_t log_size, last_entry_size;
+	efi_bool_t truncated;
+	void *tcg2_protocol;
+
+	status = efi_call_early(locate_protocol, &tcg2_guid, NULL,
+				&tcg2_protocol);
+	if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
+		return;
+
+	status = efi_call_proto(efi_tcg2_protocol, get_event_log, tcg2_protocol,
+				EFI_TCG2_EVENT_LOG_FORMAT_TCG_1_2,
+				&log_location, &log_last_entry, &truncated);
+	if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
+		return;
+
+	if (!log_location)
+		return;
+	first_entry_addr = (unsigned long) log_location;
+
+	/*
+	 * We populate the EFI table even if the logs are empty.
+	 */
+	if (!log_last_entry) {
+		log_size = 0;
+	} else {
+		last_entry_addr = (unsigned long) log_last_entry;
+		/*
+		 * get_event_log only returns the address of the last entry.
+		 * We need to calculate its size to deduce the full size of
+		 * the logs.
+		 */
+		last_entry_size = sizeof(struct tcpa_event) +
+			((struct tcpa_event *) last_entry_addr)->event_size;
+		log_size = log_last_entry - log_location + last_entry_size;
+	}
+
+	/* Allocate space for the logs and copy them. */
+	status = efi_call_early(allocate_pool, EFI_LOADER_DATA,
+				sizeof(*log_tbl) + log_size,
+				(void **) &log_tbl);
+
+	if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) {
+		efi_printk(sys_table_arg,
+			   "Unable to allocate memory for event log\n");
+		return;
+	}
+
+	memset(log_tbl, 0, sizeof(*log_tbl) + log_size);
+	log_tbl->size = log_size;
+	log_tbl->version = EFI_TCG2_EVENT_LOG_FORMAT_TCG_1_2;
+	memcpy(log_tbl->log, (void *) first_entry_addr, log_size);
+
+	status = efi_call_early(install_configuration_table,
+				&linux_eventlog_guid, log_tbl);
+	if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
+		goto err_free;
+	return;
+
+err_free:
+	efi_call_early(free_pool, log_tbl);
+}
+
+void efi_retrieve_tpm2_eventlog(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg)
+{
+	/* Only try to retrieve the logs in 1.2 format. */
+	efi_retrieve_tpm2_eventlog_1_2(sys_table_arg);
+}
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/tpm.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/tpm.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..0cbeb3d46b18
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/tpm.c
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ 
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2017 Google, Inc.
+ *     Thiebaud Weksteen <tweek@google.com>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/efi.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/memblock.h>
+
+#include <asm/early_ioremap.h>
+
+/*
+ * Reserve the memory associated with the TPM Event Log configuration table.
+ */
+int __init efi_tpm_eventlog_init(void)
+{
+	struct linux_efi_tpm_eventlog *log_tbl;
+	unsigned int tbl_size;
+
+	if (efi.tpm_log == EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR)
+		return 0;
+
+	log_tbl = early_memremap(efi.tpm_log, sizeof(*log_tbl));
+	if (!log_tbl) {
+		pr_err("Failed to map TPM Event Log table @ 0x%lx\n",
+			efi.tpm_log);
+		efi.tpm_log = EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR;
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	tbl_size = sizeof(*log_tbl) + log_tbl->size;
+	memblock_reserve(efi.tpm_log, tbl_size);
+	early_memunmap(log_tbl, sizeof(*log_tbl));
+	return 0;
+}
+
diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h
index 8dc3d94a3e3c..c5805eb601b1 100644
--- a/include/linux/efi.h
+++ b/include/linux/efi.h
@@ -472,6 +472,39 @@  typedef struct {
 	u64 get_all;
 } apple_properties_protocol_64_t;
 
+typedef struct {
+	u32 get_capability;
+	u32 get_event_log;
+	u32 hash_log_extend_event;
+	u32 submit_command;
+	u32 get_active_pcr_banks;
+	u32 set_active_pcr_banks;
+	u32 get_result_of_set_active_pcr_banks;
+} efi_tcg2_protocol_32_t;
+
+typedef struct {
+	u64 get_capability;
+	u64 get_event_log;
+	u64 hash_log_extend_event;
+	u64 submit_command;
+	u64 get_active_pcr_banks;
+	u64 set_active_pcr_banks;
+	u64 get_result_of_set_active_pcr_banks;
+} efi_tcg2_protocol_64_t;
+
+typedef u32 efi_tcg2_event_log_format;
+
+typedef struct {
+	void *get_capability;
+	efi_status_t (*get_event_log)(efi_handle_t, efi_tcg2_event_log_format,
+		efi_physical_addr_t *, efi_physical_addr_t *, efi_bool_t *);
+	void *hash_log_extend_event;
+	void *submit_command;
+	void *get_active_pcr_banks;
+	void *set_active_pcr_banks;
+	void *get_result_of_set_active_pcr_banks;
+} efi_tcg2_protocol_t;
+
 /*
  * Types and defines for EFI ResetSystem
  */
@@ -622,6 +655,7 @@  void efi_native_runtime_setup(void);
 #define EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE_GUID	EFI_GUID(0xdcfa911d, 0x26eb, 0x469f,  0xa2, 0x20, 0x38, 0xb7, 0xdc, 0x46, 0x12, 0x20)
 #define EFI_CONSOLE_OUT_DEVICE_GUID		EFI_GUID(0xd3b36f2c, 0xd551, 0x11d4,  0x9a, 0x46, 0x00, 0x90, 0x27, 0x3f, 0xc1, 0x4d)
 #define APPLE_PROPERTIES_PROTOCOL_GUID		EFI_GUID(0x91bd12fe, 0xf6c3, 0x44fb,  0xa5, 0xb7, 0x51, 0x22, 0xab, 0x30, 0x3a, 0xe0)
+#define EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL_GUID			EFI_GUID(0x607f766c, 0x7455, 0x42be,  0x93, 0x0b, 0xe4, 0xd7, 0x6d, 0xb2, 0x72, 0x0f)
 
 #define EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE_GUID	EFI_GUID(0xd719b2cb, 0x3d3a, 0x4596,  0xa3, 0xbc, 0xda, 0xd0, 0x0e, 0x67, 0x65, 0x6f)
 #define EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID			EFI_GUID(0x605dab50, 0xe046, 0x4300,  0xab, 0xb6, 0x3d, 0xd8, 0x10, 0xdd, 0x8b, 0x23)
@@ -634,6 +668,7 @@  void efi_native_runtime_setup(void);
 #define LINUX_EFI_ARM_SCREEN_INFO_TABLE_GUID	EFI_GUID(0xe03fc20a, 0x85dc, 0x406e,  0xb9, 0x0e, 0x4a, 0xb5, 0x02, 0x37, 0x1d, 0x95)
 #define LINUX_EFI_LOADER_ENTRY_GUID		EFI_GUID(0x4a67b082, 0x0a4c, 0x41cf,  0xb6, 0xc7, 0x44, 0x0b, 0x29, 0xbb, 0x8c, 0x4f)
 #define LINUX_EFI_RANDOM_SEED_TABLE_GUID	EFI_GUID(0x1ce1e5bc, 0x7ceb, 0x42f2,  0x81, 0xe5, 0x8a, 0xad, 0xf1, 0x80, 0xf5, 0x7b)
+#define LINUX_EFI_TPM_EVENT_LOG_GUID		EFI_GUID(0xb7799cb0, 0xeca2, 0x4943,  0x96, 0x67, 0x1f, 0xae, 0x07, 0xb7, 0x47, 0xfa)
 
 typedef struct {
 	efi_guid_t guid;
@@ -908,6 +943,7 @@  extern struct efi {
 	unsigned long properties_table;	/* properties table */
 	unsigned long mem_attr_table;	/* memory attributes table */
 	unsigned long rng_seed;		/* UEFI firmware random seed */
+	unsigned long tpm_log;		/* TPM2 Event Log table */
 	efi_get_time_t *get_time;
 	efi_set_time_t *set_time;
 	efi_get_wakeup_time_t *get_wakeup_time;
@@ -1504,6 +1540,8 @@  static inline void
 efi_enable_reset_attack_mitigation(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg) { }
 #endif
 
+void efi_retrieve_tpm2_eventlog(efi_system_table_t *sys_table);
+
 /*
  * Arch code can implement the following three template macros, avoiding
  * reptition for the void/non-void return cases of {__,}efi_call_virt():
@@ -1571,4 +1609,12 @@  struct linux_efi_random_seed {
 	u8	bits[];
 };
 
+struct linux_efi_tpm_eventlog {
+	u32	size;
+	u8	version;
+	u8	log[];
+};
+
+extern int efi_tpm_eventlog_init(void);
+
 #endif /* _LINUX_EFI_H */